A Club No More - The WTO after Doha

Since its inception the GATT, and subsequently the WTO, has been able to operate in a fashion that is more consistent with a club than an inclusive organization that encouraged the active participation of all its members. The WTO Ministerial Meeting in Doha in November 2001 appears to have been a watershed in how the organization functions, and the club model may no longer be appropriate. While it is not yet clear what will replace the previous model, it is apparent that decision making will be much more diffused and the interests of a much broader spectrum of member countries taken into account. The central question is whether or not the transformed organization can still serve the interests of those who were previously able to dominate the club–the major trading nations. If it cannot, they may look for another club that will better serve their purposes, and all the effort that has gone into building a well functioning multilateral trade regime will have been for naught. Those members that worked so hard to end the club may not reap the benefits they expect unless they are prudent in how they use the power that they now hold within the WTO.club, developing countries, Doha, international trade, multilateral organization, WTO, International Relations/Trade,

A New World Chaos? International Institutions in the Information Age

The technological revolutions that underlie the new information age will tax considerably the abilities of existing international institutions to bring order to international relations. Rapid rates of change may lead to chaos if international institutions cannot evolve to accommodate those changes. In some cases, new organisations will be required. The role given international organisations in establishing order in the latter half of the 20th century is reviewed. The new challenges presented by the information age are outlined. Whether the existing international organisations will be sufficiently flexible to accommodate the changes brought by the information age is assessed.change, globalisation, international institutions, law, trade policy, International Relations/Trade,

Special and Differential Treatment: A Mechanism to Promote Development?

Much has been made of "special and differential" treatment in the Doha Development Round of WTO negotiations. In particular, a conscious effort has been made to infer that special and differential treatment will promote development. While special and differential treatment may be a necessary evil given developing countries' higher adjustment costs, dignifying it as a development mechanism plays into the hands of protectionist interests. In particular, by allowing a general increase in the ability of developing countries to isolate their economies, it may reduce the efficacy of important forces that prod institutional reforms in developing countries. As institutional reform is one of the keys to economic development, lionizing special and differential treatment in the WTO is likely to be counterproductive.development, institutional reform, protectionism, special and differential treatment, WTO, International Development,

The continuously supported rail subjected to an axial force and a moving load

Axial compression force effects in welded rails on critical velocity for high speed trai

International Harmonization and the Gains from Trade

International harmonization of standards and regulations is often a goal expressed in trade agreements because it is expected to yield gains from trade. Absence of progress toward harmonization is often interpreted as being motivated by protectionism, with differences in standards and regulations seen as non-tariff barriers. While protectionism may well be the source of resistance to harmonization, there may be other reasons it is not pursued. These alternative explanations have not received much attention from economists. In this article some of these alternatives are outlined - demand effects from altering standards, switching costs, proprietary technologies. The article concludes that proposals for international harmonization need to be scrutinized carefully.demand effects, harmonization, regulation, standards, switching costs, TBT, International Relations/Trade,

The Efficacy of TRIPS: Incentives, Capacity and Threats

There is a major split between developed and developing countries over the protection of the patents in pharmaceuticals in the TRIPS. This dispute is symptomatic of the difficulties of incorporating a non-trade issue into a trade organization. Incentives and threats are examined in the context of the TRIPS. It is concluded that developing countries have no direct incentives to protect intellectual property, that the threat of trade actions is unlikely to induce compliance and that the use of indirect incentives is discredited and will fail to achieve its objective over the long run. Successful protection of intellectual property in developing countries will require a way to provide them with a direct incentive to enforce such protection.enforcement, incentives, intellectual property, knowledge economy, threats, TRIPS, International Relations/Trade,

Who Should Make the Rules of Trade? - The Complex Issue of Multilateral Environmental Agreements

In recent years, governments have negotiated a number of Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) that include clauses regarding trade measures that conflict with their WTO obligations. As yet, there has been no formal dispute regarding which obligations should prevail, but the threat of conflict is perceived to be sufficiently grave for the parties to the Doha Ministerial to agree to examine the issue. Those who have strong preferences for environmental amenities have put considerable effort into fostering MEAs and are lobbying hard for them to prevail over the WTO in their areas of competence. The current lack of transparency caused by conflicting rules increases the degree of risk perceived in the international commercial environment. As MEAs allow trading partners to impose trade barriers on ratifying partners when the WTO rules would not, a perverse set of incentives is created that may lead to sub-optimal levels of environmental protection as well as sub-optimal amounts of investment in trade-related activities. The use of trade measures in MEAs is examined and suggestions are provided for removing the conflicting rules of trade.Doha, MEA, negotiations, ratification, trade measures, WTO, International Relations/Trade,

SELECTIVE BREEDING, HERITABLE CHARACTERISTICS AND GENETIC-BASED TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE IN THE CANADIAN BEEF CATTLE INDUSTRY

The paper presents an examination of genetic-based technological change in the Canadian beef cattle industry. A model of technological change is explicitly developed in characteristics space. Production functions with genetic characteristics as arguments are estimated and two forms of technological change identified. Shadow values for characteristics are then calculated and actual genetic improvements are compared to the improvements suggested by the shadow prices. It is concluded that market forces are sufficient to regulate the process of genetic-based technological change in the Canadian beef cattle industry.Livestock Production/Industries, Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies,

Trade Agreements: The Important Role of Transparency

International trade can be inhibited in two ways; through the use of mechanisms that directly alter the flow of goods and poor transparency in the rules of trade. The former includes tariffs and other border measures, subsidies and non-tariff barriers. The effect on trade flows resulting from issues of transparency is indirect. When the rules of trade are unclear for firms considering investing in trade related activities, the risks associated with those investments increase and investment is inhibited. If there is less investment in trade related activities, trade flows will be reduced. Poor transparency exists in contingent protection measures such as anti-dumping – currently on the agenda of the Rules negotiations at the WTO and – customs and related procedures – on the agenda in the Trade Facilitation negotiations. Increasing transparency can have important trade liberalizing effects. Trade negotiators often focus on achieving a big result from reductions in border measures and subsidies where there may be considerable resistance from protectionist vested interests. If progress can be made in increasing the transparency of trade rules, a less ambitious result may be acceptable for the direct aspects of trade liberalization.investment, liberalization, risk, transparency, International Relations/Trade,

Strategic Devaluation, Trade and Political Convenience

The economies of developed countries have, since 2007, experienced the most significant and persistent period of economic malaise since the 1930s. Domestic economic policies have failed to revive sustained economic growth and, as a result, unemployment remains at levels that voters find difficult to accept. In addition, without tax revenue-enhancing growth, government deficits persist, and borrowing to finance the cumulative deficits has become increasingly difficult for some countries. With domestic policies largely exhausted, but economic growth elusive, policy makers have been considering external policies as a means to stimulate their economies. Trade protectionism and strategic devaluation are potential policies. The lessons of the 1930s regarding the dangers of beggar thy neighbour protectionism appear to retain their currency with policy makers, but the same may not be true for strategic devaluation. The article outlines the likely poor efficacy of strategic devaluation as a politically convenient mechanism to escape the current economic malaise.Cooperative solution, Great Depression, retaliation, strategic devaluation, trade, Financial Economics, Institutional and Behavioral Economics, International Relations/Trade, Political Economy,